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Retaliation and Requesting 
Religious Accommodation 
Charles A. Sullivan† 
Abstract 
A recent Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision on an issue of 
first impression suggests that requests for reasonable accommodations 
of religious practices or observances are generally not protected conduct 
within the scope of § 704, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. The 
court reasoned that such a request does not fall within that provision’s 
“opposition” clause because it did not “oppose” anything the employee 
could have reasonably believed was discriminatory. 
This counterintuitive holding suggests to employees that accom–
modation requests are perilous, and thus threatens Title VII’s goal of 
requiring employers to reasonably accommodate believers. It is true 
that Supreme Court precedent protects an employee when the employer 
must grant his or her accommodation because it is reasonable and does 
not cause an undue hardship on the employer. In such cases, retaliating 
against the employee is viewed as core religious discrimination, which 
is prohibited under § 703, and so there is no need to invoke § 704. 
But what if the accommodation is not legally required under Title 
VII? That is a very common scenario given the Supreme Court’s 
longstanding and extraordinarily narrow reading of the duty of accom–
modation under the statute. And if the Eighth Circuit’s view were to 
be generally adopted, employers would seem to be largely free not 
merely to deny the request but also to take adverse employment actions 
against those foolish enough to make one. 
This Article analyzes the complicated interaction between § 703’s 
accommodation command and § 704’s retaliation prohibition. In the 
process, it rejects the “no harm, no foul” argument sometimes made: 
that denying employment to or firing a worker who seeks an “unreas–
onable accommodation” is not actionable because the worker will not 
perform the job requirements in any event. Such a view is predicated 
on the false notion that employees can seek accommodations only when 
they are faced with the choice between their religion and their job. In 
many cases, believers seek accommodations when their religion encour–
ages (or discourages) but does not mandate (or prohibit) the conduct 
in question, a point that is often unappreciated. 
The Article concludes that the Eighth Circuit was wrong in its 
reading of § 704 as applied to requests for accommodation. Further, it 
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argues that, regardless of the correct reading of that provision, taking 
adverse action against a worker whose accommodation request was 
legitimately denied may violate § 703’s prohibition of status discrim–
ination, a question not answered by the Eighth Circuit. 
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Introduction 
Long before the Americans with Disabilities Act1 (“ADA”) required 
employers to accommodate disabilities, Title VII created exactly that 
duty for religion.2 As amended in 1972,3 § 701(j) defined religion (an 
undefined protected category in the original 1964 enactment) to 
“includ[e] all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as 
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably 
accommodate [such] religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”4 Almost twenty 
 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012).  
2. Rather than being framed as a separate duty, the reasonable-accom–
modation requirement was “incorporated into the statute, somewhat awk–
wardly, in the definition of religion.” See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. 
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 63 n.1 (1986). 
3. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 
103 (1972). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2018). The 
amendment was largely a response to the Supreme Court affirming the 
Sixth Circuit’s rejection of an Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) regulation requiring a religious-accommodation 
duty under Title VII. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 
709, 714 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev’d, 429 F.2d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d 
by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam). The 
section’s legislative history demonstrates a desire on the part of its Senate 
sponsor, Senator Jennings Randolph (himself a Seventh-Day Baptist), to 
reduce the incidences of believers’ forced choices between faith and 
employment. See Roberto L. Corrada, Toward an Integrated Disparate 
Treatment and Accommodation Framework for Title VII Religion Cases, 
77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1411, 1427–31 (2009); Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: 
The Employer’s Duty to Accommodate Employee Religious Practices 
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years later, the ADA imposed a similar duty by prohibiting discrim–
ination on the basis of disability and defining discrimination to include 
failing to make reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals 
with a disability.5 
Title VII’s duty of accommodation, however, has been far less 
robust than its ADA analog,6 and certainly less robust than its 
statutory language suggests. Indeed, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Hardison,7 the Court read the “undue hardship” exception to largely 
swallow the accommodation rule.8 The case involved a Saturday 
Sabbatarian who asked that a shift schedule requiring Saturday work 
be modified to accommodate his beliefs.9 He proposed a number of 
alternatives, but the Court found each to involve an “undue hardship” 
under a remarkably deferential definition: “[t]o require TWA to bear 
more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is 
 
Under Title VII after Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 513, 534 n.70 (1989). 
5. The Act defines discrimination to include: 
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical 
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered 
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered 
entity; or 
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or 
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered 
entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or 
mental impairments of the employee or applicant. 
 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5) (2012). 
6. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, A New Look at the ADA’s Undue Hardship 
Defense, 84 Mo. L. Rev. 121, 126 (2019). Professor Porter reports that 
the ADA’s legislative history contains explicit language rejecting the 
standard in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
Porter, supra, at 126 n.36. For example, the Senate Report states: 
The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 
63 (1977) are not applicable to this legislation. In Hardison, the 
Supreme Court concluded that under [T]itle VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 an employer need not accommodate persons 
with religious beliefs if the accommodation would require more 
than a de minimis cost for the employer.  
 S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 36 (1989); see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 
4, at 46 (1990). 
7. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
8. See infra Part II. 
9. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 67–68. 
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an undue hardship.”10 While this Article explores the Court’s reasons 
for such an antitextual reading,11 Hardison’s restrictive approach to 
religious accommodations continues to govern Title VII cases.12 Never–
theless, Title VII’s duty is not without teeth. A number of decisions 
have held in the employee’s favor.13 Indeed, a recent case made 
headlines when a jury awarded a hotel dishwasher twenty-one million 
dollars in damages for being required to work on Sundays.14 Although 
statutory caps will prevent most of that from ever being collected,15 the 
verdict sends a message to employers to take requests for accom–
modation seriously. 
Yet at roughly the same time the media was relaying that news, 
employers were receiving another, more nuanced message from the 
judiciary that seemed to free employers to retaliate against workers 
seeking accommodations. In EEOC v. North Memorial Health Care,16 a 
 
10. Id. at 84. 
11. See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
12. Four justices, concurring in a recent denial of certiorari, hinted at a 
willingness to revisit Hardison. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 
S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (noting that, in Hardison, “the Court opined that 
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of religion does not 
require an employer to make any accommodation that imposes more than 
a de minimis burden. In this case, however, we have not been asked to 
revisit [that] decision[].”). A petition for certiorari raising that exact issue 
is pending in Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 727 F. App’x 581 (11th Cir. 
2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-349, Sept. 17, 2018; and, of course, 
four justices are sufficient to grant it. See Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 
SCOTUSblog, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/patterson-
v-walgreen-co/ [https://perma.cc/6QV4-Y9GE] (last visited Dec. 17, 
2019). 
13. See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
14. Janelle Griffith, Hotel Dishwasher Awarded $21 Million After Boss Made 
Her Work on Sundays, NBC News (Jan. 17, 2019, 9:13 AM), https:// 
 www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/hotel-dishwasher-awarded-21-million-
after-boss-made-her-work-n959401 [https://perma.cc/C96X-R4N2]. 
15. Title VII originally did not authorize the recovery of damages; rather it 
provided only for equitable relief, including backpay. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981a (2012) (authorizing damages in disparate treatment Title VII 
cases after the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also id. § 1981a(c) (including 
the right to a jury trial when damages are sought in disparate treatment 
Title VII cases). Although § 1981a describes compensatory damages 
broadly—i.e., as “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, 
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other 
nonpecuniary losses”—it caps both compensatory and punitive damages 
at between $50,000 and $300,000, depending on the employer’s size. Id. 
§ 1981a(b)(3). Those caps are not applicable to Title VII equitable relief, 
such as “backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief 
authorized under section 706(g).” Id. § 1981a(b)(2). 
16. 908 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2018). 
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divided panel of the Eighth Circuit considered whether a request for a 
religious accommodation was protected under § 704(a)’s prohibition of 
retaliation for “opposing” discrimination.17 The majority rejected the 
claim that such requests are generally protected activity, essentially 
because such requests do not “oppose” anything.18 Therefore, the 
hospital had not retaliated when it rescinded a conditional employment 
offer after concluding it could not grant a requested accommodation.19 
Of course, the employer could have been correct or incorrect in its 
conclusion that it need not accommodate in the circumstances. If it 
were wrong, that is, if the requested accommodation was “reasonable” 
and not an “undue hardship,” the employer would have violated 
§ 703(a)’s bar on discrimination on the basis of religion20 and there 
would be no need for a retaliation claim. If it were right, however, no 
§ 703 status-discrimination claim would lie, but a retaliation claim 
under § 704 might be plausible, North Memorial notwithstanding. At 
first glance, this seems odd: if the applicant would not have worked 
without accommodation, she is being turned down for inability to 
perform the job, not for requesting accommodation. But that assumes 
that accommodations are sought only by those whose religion bars them 
from working without them, which both oversimplifies religious beliefs 
and misreads the statute. In North Memorial itself, the applicant had 
indicated she would have worked without the requested accom–
modation.21 In such situations, a retaliation claim may be critical to 
furthering Congress’s accommodation requirement. 
To understand the problem, it is critical to appreciate that the 
typical way an employer learns of the need for an accommodation is by 
the employee requesting one (which is generally also true for ADA 
accommodations).22 Nor is this unreasonable since inquiring into an 
 
17. Id. at 1102. This was the first circuit court to address the question at 
length. Six years before North Memorial, the Seventh Circuit had assumed 
that requesting a religious accommodation is protected from retaliation. 
See Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 957 (7th Cir. 2012). Several 
district courts take the same stance as the Seventh Circuit. See e.g., Lewis 
v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 12 F. Supp. 3d 418, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). 
18. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1103. 
19. See infra notes 94–108 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
21. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1100. 
22. U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Interpretive Guidance on Title I 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9, at 421 
(2018) (stating that it is generally “the responsibility of the individual 
with a disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is 
needed”). Such a default rule makes sense in light of the statute’s explicit 
bar on inquiry into disabilities. See Kobus v. Coll. of Saint Scholastica, 
Inc., 608 F.3d 1034, 1038–39 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming that an employee 
who did not reveal his treatment for depression and whose limitations 
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employee’s religious beliefs violates current privacy norms and raises 
the potential for discrimination claims, should an adverse action follow. 
Further, there are myriad religions with differing beliefs and practices23 
and different observances even among those who nominally share a 
particular faith.24 Accordingly, to trigger any duty, the employee must 
normally alert her employer of her desire for an accommodation because 
her belief or observance conflicts with a workplace requirement.25 
Given the centrality of such requests to the statutory scheme, it is 
scarcely surprising that requests for accommodation have been routine–
ly held to be protected conduct under the ADA.26 One paragraph of the 
relevant ADA antiretaliation provision tracks the language of Title 
VII,27 and most courts have read it to protect requests for accom–
 
were not apparent at work had no failure-to-accommodate claim when he 
was fired for excessive absenteeism resulting from the depression). 
 Yet because the ADA addresses accommodating “known” disabilities, 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012), there are a few cases suggesting employers 
should act even absent an employee’s request when the employer 
otherwise “knows” about the difficulty the disabled employee faces. See, 
e.g., EEOC v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 491 F.3d 790, 795–
96 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a wheelchair-bound employee is not 
required to request specific accommodations to trigger employer duty). 
The EEOC’s interpretive guidance also notes that “[i]f an employee with 
a known disability is having difficulty performing his or her job, an 
employer may inquire whether the employee is in need of a reasonable 
accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. app § 1630.9, at 421 (2018). This seems to 
permit, but not require, an inquiry, thus leaving the ball squarely in the 
worker’s court. 
23. See Dallan F. Flake, Interactive Religious Accommodation, 71 Ala. L. 
Rev. 67, 71–72 (2019). 
24. See, e.g., Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298 (Mass. 
1996) (regarding a conflict between particular Catholics’ beliefs and 
official Catholic Church dogma). 
25. Accordingly, courts frequently spoke in these terms about plaintiff’s prima 
facie, failure-to-accommodate case. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, 
Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1575 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In order to establish a prima 
facie case of religious discrimination, a plaintiff must show that the 
observance or practice conflicting with an employment requirement is 
religious in nature, that she called the religious observance or practice to 
her employer’s attention, and that the religious observance or practice 
was the basis for her discharge or other discriminatory treatment.”). The 
status of a failure-to-accommodate case is discussed in Part I infra. 
26. See infra note 37. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2012) (“No person shall discriminate against any 
individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made 
unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”). 
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modation, despite the textual obstacle North Memorial raised.28 But the 
issue of whether requests are protected conduct may be less important 
under the ADA than under Title VII since another paragraph of the 
ADA bars coercing, intimidating, threatening, or interfering with the 
exercises of ADA rights,29 a provision which has no parallel in Title VII. 
It seems likely that retaliation for requesting an accommodation would 
interfere with the employee’s ADA right to such an accommodation.30 
And there lies the problem. Section 704(a) of Title VII bars 
employer retaliation against an employee or applicant either “[(1)] 
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter, or [(2)] because he has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”31  
According to North Memorial, that language does not embrace an 
applicant who is denied a job because she requested an accommodation 
for her religious observance.32 First, the individual in question had not 
filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) or otherwise fallen within the “participation” clause of the 
paragraph. Second, her request could not be viewed as “opposition” to 
any employment practice that was either illegal under Title VII or 
reasonably perceived to be illegal. Thus, a plain textual reading of the 
statute meant that employers are free to retaliate against those who 
request religious accommodations.33 
 
28. See infra notes 126–132 and accompanying text. 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, 
threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, 
or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of 
his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise 
or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.”). 
30. See Willis v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 12 C 07662, 2015 WL 3859191, at 
*8 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2015) (noting that although defendant’s argument 
that requesting accommodation is not protected conduct under § 12203(a) 
“might be technically correct,” § 12203(b) protects such requests); see 
also Kirkeberg v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 907 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(questioning how the ADA rule can be squared with the text of 
§ 12203(a)). 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012). 
32. EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1103 (8th Cir. 2018). 
33. Given the “interference” clause in the ADA, a textual argument against 
protecting disability-accommodation requests is more difficult to make 
out but not impossible: It could be claimed that, while a discharge for 
seeking such an accommodation would be “interference,” it would not 
interfere with “any right granted or protected by this chapter” unless the 
individual actually was due an accommodation; otherwise, it would not 
interfere with “any right granted or protected by this chapter.” See 42 
U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2012). 
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An important qualification is necessary here. As discussed below, 
refusing to hire an applicant because of the need to make a required 
accommodation (that is, a reasonable accommodation that is not an 
undue hardship) would violate Title VII’s prohibition of religious disc–
rimination in § 703.34 Thus, it will make little difference whether an 
applicant has a claim under § 703 or § 704 when an employer refuses 
to hire a person because it would be required to accommodate her. 
However, where the request for accommodation could be legally 
denied, § 703 is arguably not implicated, and North Memorial suggests 
the employer is largely free to retaliate against the applicant or 
employee under § 704.35 And, given the weak version of the duty to 
accommodate under Title VII, that is far more likely to be true under 
that statute than under the ADA.36 In short, North Memorial poses a 
serious disincentive to employees seeking religious accommodations. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the duty not to 
discriminate on the basis of religion under Title VII as developed by 
the Supreme Court most recently in EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch 
Stores, Inc.37 Part II explores the North Memorial holding that requests 
for accommodation are not generally protected conduct. Finally, Part 
III takes a fresh look at the problem. It concludes that, whether or not 
North Memorial is correct on the § 704 issue it decided, a correct 
reading of Title VII would make illegal a refusal to hire because of a 
request for an accommodation. 
 
34. And, as discussed, the ADA expressly so provides. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(b)(5) (2012). 
35. One might argue that the employer should not be allowed to effectively 
pretermit any accommodation analysis even under § 703. Even if, after 
the fact, it does not appear that any duty has been breached, it may be 
that the employer should be required to explore possible accommodations, 
especially given that there may be some adjustments that the employee 
can make. See Flake, supra note 23, at 71 (urging recognition of an 
interactive process for religious-accommodation claims under Title VII). 
 However, not only have the courts not generally required an interactive 
process under Title VII, but even under the ADA they have generally 
refused to hold employers liable for simply failing to engage in the 
interactive process required under the ADA unless there is a showing that 
a reasonable accommodation was available. E.g., McBride v. BIC 
Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 97, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding 
that because the plaintiff “provided no evidence that there existed any 
potential accommodation that would have allowed her to continue to 
work,” the employer’s failure to engage in interactive process was not a 
violation); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2018).  
36. See supra notes 6–13 and accompanying text. 
37. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
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I. The Duty Not to Discriminate on the Basis of 
Religion 
For most of its history, Title VII’s prohibition of religious discrim–
ination was generally understood to give rise to two separate theories 
of liability.38 The first, discrimination simpliciter, was essentially 
disparate treatment on the basis of religion, which tracked similar 
claims for race or sex discrimination.39 These cases were typically 
pursued under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green litigation 
structure,40 but are presumably also analyzed under the “motivating 
factor” standard after the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments.41 In 
either case, the typical question is whether the employee or applicant 
suffered an adverse employment action motivated at least in part by 
the plaintiff’s religious beliefs and practices.42 As in the vast majority 
of individual disparate-treatment cases, the central question is almost 
always whether the challenged adverse action was taken because of 
religion or for some other reason.43 More favorable treatment of compar–
ators is often a critical element of proof.44 
The second theory of liability was failure to accommodate. In these 
cases, the applicant or employee is denied a requested accommodation.45 
In this setting, there is no inquiry into the employer’s intent; the only 
issue, typically, is whether there is a reasonable accommodation avail–
able and, if so, whether it would nevertheless have been an undue 
 
38. See Corrada, supra note 4, at 1412–13 (“[M]ost judges, lawyers, legal 
academics, and law students come to understand that most, if not all, 
religious discrimination claims are divided into either discrimination/bias 
cases or accommodation cases. To determine the result in any given 
religious discrimination case, one must simply choose the appropriate case 
category (discrimination or accommodation) and then follow the required 
analytical path.”) (footnotes omitted). 
39. See, e.g., Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Sys., 293 F. Supp. 2d 622, 
629 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
40. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The litigation structure of such cases is a familiar 
one designed to determine whether the adverse employment action at 
issue was the result of employer bias or a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason. Id. at 802. See generally Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J. 
Zimmer, Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination 14–
24 (2017). 
41. See infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
42. See, e.g., Ali v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 8 F. App’x 156, 159 (4th Cir. 2001). 
43. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Disc–
rimination by Comparators, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 191, 198–99 (2009). 
44. Id. at 198. 
45. See Corrada, supra note 4, at 1413–14.  
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hardship to require the employer to provide it.46 More favored compar–
ators were largely unnecessary (although accommodating others might 
be relevant to the proposed accommodation’s reasonableness and 
undercut a claim of undue hardship). Indeed, it is the plaintiff who asks 
to be preferred to other workers in the sense of being exempted from 
normal workplace rules for religious reasons.47 
This bifurcated litigation structure not only made some sense, given 
the different proof paths taken by the two distinct claims, but it was 
essentially the structure under the ADA.48 Regardless, the distinction 
was questioned by the Supreme Court’s decision in EEOC v. Aber–
crombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.49 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of 
the Court, and he started by positing that Title VII “prohibits a 
prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant in order to 
avoid accommodating a religious practice that it could accommodate 
without undue hardship.”50 The precise question before the Court was 
“whether this prohibition applies only where an applicant has informed 
the employer of his need for an accommodation.”51 The Court held that 
it did not. 
There, Samantha Elauf applied for a sales job at an Abercrombie 
& Fitch store. Elauf is a practicing Muslim and she wore her headscarf 
to her job interview.52 The store’s assistant manager thought Elauf was 
qualified for the job, but she was concerned that Elauf’s headscarf 
 
46. Some claims also involve issues about whether the request was religiously 
motivated to begin with, e.g., Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 
125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that veganism is a 
secular philosophy, not a religion); whether the requesting employee was 
sincere, see infra note 161; or whether the religion required the accom–
modation, see infra note 157. 
47. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of 
Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360–61 (3rd Cir. 1999).  
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2012); see also, e.g., Hunt v. Monro Muffler 
Brake, Inc., 769 F. App’x 253, 258 (6th Cir. 2019) (“To establish a prima 
facie case of failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is 
disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified for 
the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) his employer 
knew or had reason to know about his disability; (4) he requested an 
accommodation; and (5) the employer failed to provide the necessary 
accommodation.”). 
49. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
50. Id. at 2031. Notice that this framing does not address the question of 
whether an employer violates the statute when it refuses to hire an 
individual whose religious practices it is not required to accommodate. 
See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
51. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2031. 
52. Id. 
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conflicted with the store’s dress code.53 Ultimately concluding that it 
did, the district manager refused to hire Elauf. She had never mentioned 
her faith and she did not request any accommodation related to her 
religion; nor did the manager confirm with Elauf that she wore the 
headscarf for religious reasons.54 
The Court rejected Abercrombie’s contention that a showing of 
disparate treatment required the employer to have “actual knowledge” 
of an applicant’s need for an accommodation.55 “Instead, an applicant 
need only show that his need for an accommodation was a motivating 
factor in the employer’s decision.”56 That was because Title VII bars 
failure-to-hire because of an applicant’s religion, and religion includes 
religious practice. Thus, Abercrombie refused to hire Elauf because of 
her religious practices, and that was true regardless of Abercrombie’s 
actual knowledge of those practices: “[A]n employer who acts with the 
motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has 
no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would 
be needed.”57 Stated even more clearly: “An employer may not make an 




54. Id.  
55. Id. at 2032.  
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 2033. 
58. Id. Justice Alito concurred in the result, disagreeing with the majority 
largely on the question of whether an employer’s knowledge of the 
religious nature of the applicant’s observance was an element of the 
offense: 
I would hold that an employer cannot be held liable for taking an 
adverse action because of an employee’s religious practice unless 
the employer knows that the employee engages in the practice for 
a religious reason. If § 2000e-2(a)(1) really “does not impose a 
knowledge requirement,” it would be irrelevant in this case 
whether Abercrombie had any inkling that Elauf is a Muslim or 
that she wore the headscarf for a religious reason. That would be 
very strange. 
 Id. at 2035 (Alito, J., concurring). However, plaintiff need not show that 
the employer took the adverse action because of the religious nature of 
the practice. Id. at 2036. An employer risked liability if it declined to hire 
anyone who refused to work on Saturday when the applicant’s refusal 
“was known by the employer to be based on religion.” Id. In such a case, 
the applicant was “rejected because of a religious practice.” Id.   
 Justice Alito then rejected the majority’s statement that the plaintiff has 
the burden to prove a failure to accommodate. He argued that position 
“blatantly contradicts the language of the statutes,” id., which require the 
employer to “demonstrate[] that he is unable to reasonably accommodate 
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The majority apparently rejected any separate Title VII claim for 
a failure to accommodate under § 703: subsections (1) and (2), “often 
referred to as the ‘disparate treatment’ (or ‘intentional discrimination’) 
provision and the ‘disparate impact’ provision, are the only causes of 
action under Title VII.”59 Rather, such claims must be folded into the 
normal analysis. The notion that there is no distinctive claim for a 
failure to accommodate was reinforced by Justice Thomas’s separate 
opinion, which noted that “[t]he Court today rightly puts to rest the 
notion that Title VII creates a freestanding religious-accommodation 
claim.”60 
Justice Scalia, however, also stressed the difference between 
religious discrimination claims and those based on other protected 
classes. While disparate treatment on any prohibited ground is barred,61 
only religious practices must be accommodated: 
[T]he statute [does not] limit disparate-treatment claims to only 
those employer policies that treat religious practices less favorably 
than similar secular practices. . . . Title VII does not demand 
mere neutrality with regard to religious practices—that they be 
 
to [the] employee’s or prospective employee’s religious . . . practice . . . 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business,” id. 
(emphasis omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(j) (2012)). 
59. Id. at 2032 (majority opinion). 
60. Id. at 2041 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice 
Thomas’s opinion, however, faulted the majority for “creat[ing] in its 
stead an entirely new form of liability: the disparate-treatment-based-on-
equal-treatment claim.” Id. (alteration in original). Justice Thomas 
reasoned that disparate treatment under Title VII required an intent to 
treat individuals differently on the basis of a protected class. Id. at 2039. 
When all are treated the same, there can be no discrimination. Id. The 
reasonable accommodation language of § 701(j) merely required an 
employer to accommodate religious workers if it accommodated other 
workers, thus violating the equal treatment command:  
I do not dispute that a refusal to accommodate can, in some 
circumstances, constitute intentional discrimination. If an employer 
declines to accommodate a particular religious practice, yet 
accommodates a similar secular (or other denominational) 
practice, then that may be proof that he has “treated a particular 
person less favorably than others because of [a religious practice].”  
 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 
(2009)).  
61. Id. at 2033–34 (majority opinion) (“[R]eligious practice is one of the 
protected characteristics that cannot be accorded disparate treatment and 
must be accommodated.”). The sentence is odd since religion is the only 
protected characteristic that “must be accommodated.” See id.; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(j) (2012). 
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treated no worse than other practices. Rather, it gives them 
favored treatment, affirmatively obligating employers not “to fail 
or refuse to hire or discharge any individual . . . because of such 
individual’s” “religious observance and practice.”62  
By way of example, Scalia noted that, while employers are “surely 
entitled” to regulate the headwear of their workers, a refusal to hire an 
applicant who requires an accommodation to that policy may not be 
permissible: “Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way 
to the need for an accommodation.”63 
Thus, there may be only one individual disparate treatment claim 
under the statute, but it is subject to different proof where religion is 
concerned. A male claiming sex discrimination would have no disparate 
treatment claim if subject to a neutral headgear rule that he opposed 
as inconsistent with his gender.64 
The significance of the rejection of a separate claim for a failure to 
accommodate while continuing to recognize a greater duty than would 
be true for other protected characteristics is unclear. It may be that the 
Court did not mean to repudiate the circuit court authority that 
established different proof structures for plain vanilla discrimination 
claims and failure-to-accommodate claims. After all, a complaint 
seeking relief for a failure to hire because, say, the plaintiff is Jewish (a 
discrimination simplicter claim) will be litigated considerably diff–
erently than a complaint seeking relief for a similar plaintiff who was 
denied an accommodation so she could observe Shabbos.65 In the former, 
the central dispute is likely to be whether the employer discriminated 
on the ground of religion or some alternative “legitimate nondisc–
riminatory reason,” while in the latter, the central dispute is likely to 
be whether allowing the employee time off from work from sundown 
Friday to sundown Saturday is reasonable and not an undue hardship 
in light of the employer’s business interests and possible need for 
replacement workers. While Abercrombie indicated that the two claims 
merge when a job is denied in order to avoid an accommodation, 
 
62. Id. at 2034 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)).  
63. Id. This language is in some tension with the narrow scope that Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison accorded the duty of accommodation. See 
432 U.S. 63, 79, 81 (1976). The Abercrombie majority failed to even cite 
Hardison. See generally Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. 2028. 
64. See, e.g., Allison T. Steinle, Note, Appearance and Grooming Standards 
as Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, 56 Cath. U. L. Rev. 261, 277–
78 (2006). 
65. Krizhner v. PurePOWER Techs., LLC, No. CA 3:12-1802-MBS, 2013 WL 
5332686, at *4, *10 (D.S.C. Sept. 23, 2013) (granting summary judgment 
for the employer on plaintiff’s claim that the employer failed to accommodate 
his desire to observe Shabbat), aff’d, 566 F. App’x 239 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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examples of cases involving one or the other kind of violation are not 
far to seek.66 
Most obviously, some plain vanilla discrimination cases rise from 
sheer animus towards certain religions, apparently unconnected with 
any need to accommodate religious practices.67 Many of the religious 
harassment claims by Muslims in the last few years seem to be of that 
variety: the problem is not with making adjustments in work schedules 
to accommodate their religious observances but rather with resentments 
about the mere presence of Muslims in the workplace.68 
In short, the litigation for alleged violations of Title VII’s prohib–
ition of religious discrimination is almost certain to take different paths 
depending on the conduct at issue, the Supreme Court notwith–
standing.69 
II. The Grudging Duty of Religious Accommodation 
Relatively soon after § 701(j) was added to the statute, the 
Supreme Court addressed the accommodation duty in an opinion that 
narrowly constrained that section’s reach. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 
 
66. For an example of an accommodation claim, see EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., 
Inc., 849 F.2d 116, 117–18 (4th Cir. 1988); for an example of a denied-
accommodation claim, see Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 975 F. Supp. 
1055, 1057–58 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff’d, 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998). 
67. See, e.g., Johnson v. Spencer Press of Me., Inc., 364 F.3d 368, 373–74 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (discussing defendant’s inappropriate, lewd, and derogatory 
comments regarding the plaintiff’s religion and inability to work overtime 
on Sundays).  
68. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 311 (4th Cir. 
2008) (holding that the severe and pervasive harassment of Muslim 
plaintiff, which included “a steady stream of demeaning comments and 
degrading actions” (including “religiously charged epithets” such as 
“Taliban” and “towel head”), was actionable religious harassment). 
Disentangling the religious objection from what might be viewed as 
national origin or even racial discrimination is sometimes difficult given 
current geopolitical realities. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); 
Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2016); 
Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (discrimination 
against an employee based on his Arab ancestry is race discrimination 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)). 
69. See generally Bruce N. Cameron & Blaine L. Hutchison, Thinking Slow 
About Abercrombie v. Fitch: Straightening Out the Judicial Confusion in 
the Lower Courts, 46 Pepp. L. Rev. 471, app. I at 483, 505–07 (2019) 
(identifying a number of cases that continue to use the “the former prima 
facie” formulation for accommodation claims); id. at app. II, at 508–09 
(reporting decisions that modify that test to account for Abercrombie’s 
elimination of any request-for-accommodation requirement). The authors 
argue for an application of the McDonnell Douglas standard. Id. at 494, 
app. II at 508. 
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v. Hardison70 involved a Sabbatarian who asked his employer to modify 
a shift schedule that would otherwise require him to work on Saturdays. 
Doctrine under the ADA separates the question of whether an 
accommodation is reasonable to begin with from the question of 
whether it is an undue hardship and assigns the burdens of persuasion 
separately on the two issues.71 The Supreme Court has since carried this 
bifurcation over to § 701(j).72 Hardison, however, did not clearly 
differentiate between the two concepts although it spoke most clearly 
in terms of undue hardship.73 In any event, the Court had no difficulty 
holding that the various proposed accommodations were not required. 
The first issue the Court addressed was whether Trans World 
Airlines (“TWA”) was required to violate a governing collective barg–
aining agreement in order to accommodate Hardison’s inability to work 
on Saturday.74 It held no,75 a decision consistent with the Court’s later 
holding to the same effect under the ADA in US Airways, Inc. v. 
Barnett,76 which viewed such a step as unreasonable in the first place, 
and, therefore, it never reached the undue-hardship question.77 Hard–
 
70. 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
71. In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002), the Court approved 
the lower courts’ burden-shifting framework under which plaintiffs have 
the burden of showing an accommodation that “seems reasonable on its 
face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases. . . . Once the plaintiff has made 
this showing, the defendant/employer then must show special (typically 
case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the 
particular circumstances.” See id. at 401–02. 
72. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 n.2 
(“The concurrence mysteriously concludes that it is not the plaintiff’s 
burden to prove failure to accommodate. But of course that is the 
plaintiff’s burden, if failure to hire ‘because of’ the plaintiff’s ‘religious practice’ 
is the gravamen of the complaint. . . . ‘The clause that begins with the 
word “unless,”’ as the concurrence describes it, has no function except to 
place upon the employer the burden of establishing an ‘undue hardship’ 
defense.”) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 2036 (Alito, J., concurring)); 
cf. id. at 2036 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The clause that begins with the 
term ‘unless’ unmistakably sets out an employer defense. If an employer 
chooses to assert that defense, it bears both the burden of production and 
the burden of persuasion. A plaintiff, on the other hand, must prove the 
elements set out prior to the ‘unless’ clause, but that portion of the rule 
makes no mention of accommodation.”). 
73. See generally Hardison, 432 U.S. 63. 
74. Id. at 67–68, 75–76.  
75. Id. at 79–81. 
76. 535 U.S. 391 (2002). The ADA lacks Title VII’s exception for bona fide 
seniority systems, which the Hardison Court cited as supporting its 
conclusion. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81–82. 
77. See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401–02, 406.  
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ison was not so precise in its analysis, but it left no doubt that 
employers are not required to provide accommodations that violate 
collective bargaining agreements.78 
While some workarounds might have accommodated Hardison 
while leaving the collective bargaining agreement intact, the Court 
concluded that each of the plaintiff’s alternatives amounted to an 
“undue hardship” under an astonishingly deferential definition: “To 
require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give 
Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”79 While it is not 
surprising that requiring TWA to pay workers premium rates to fill-in 
for Hardison violated that test, the Court went further to strongly 
suggest that any favoring of Hardison’s religious needs over coworkers 
with strong but nonreligious shift preferences was itself impermissible: 
Title VII does not contemplate such unequal treatment. The 
repeated, unequivocal emphasis of both the language and the 
legislative history of Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in 
employment, and such discrimination is proscribed when it is 
directed against majorities as well as minorities. . . . It would be 
anomalous to conclude that by “reasonable accommodation” 
Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job 
preference of some employees, as well as deprive them of their 
contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the religious 
needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII does not require 
an employer to go that far.80  
The Court continued: 
Like abandonment of the seniority system, to require TWA to 
bear additional costs when no such costs are incurred to give other 
employees the days off that they want would involve unequal 
treatment of employees on the basis of their religion. By 
suggesting that TWA should incur certain costs in order to give 
Hardison Saturdays off the Court of Appeals would in effect 
require TWA to finance an additional Saturday off and then to 
choose the employee who will enjoy it on the basis of his religious 
beliefs. While incurring extra costs to secure a replacement for 
Hardison might remove the necessity of compelling another 
employee to work involuntarily in Hardison’s place, it would not 
change the fact that the privilege of having Saturdays off would 
be allocated according to religious beliefs.81  
 
78. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79, 83 & n.14.  
79. Id. at 84. 
80. Id. at 81.  
81. Id. at 84–85. The Court summarized:  
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This decision, rendered over Justice Marshall’s dissent, which 
Justice Brennan joined,82 went far to restrict the duty of reasonable 
accommodation.83 Although one might wonder whether Abercrombie’s 
studied avoidance of limitations on the duty to accommodate signaled 
some doubt on the question,84 Hardison remains an extraordinarily 
grudging interpretation of the statute. 
The Court’s antitextual reading seems to have resulted from the 
tension it identified between the plain language of § 701(j) and the 
statute’s overall equal-treatment goal,85 although it could easily have 
found the duty of accommodation to be an explicit exception to the 
statute’s more general nondiscrimination command. This led some 
commentators to argue that Hardison’s strained interpretation was 
driven by Establishment Clause concerns should Congress be held to 
have imposed a too-robust duty to accommodate.86 The constitutional 
 
[T]he paramount concern of Congress in enacting Title VII was 
the elimination of discrimination in employment. In the absence 
of clear statutory language or legislative history to the contrary, 
we will not readily construe the statute to require an employer to 
discriminate against some employees in order to enable others to 
observe their Sabbath. 
 Id. at 85. 
82. Id. at 85–87 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Court holds, in essence, that 
although the EEOC regulations and the Act state that an employer must 
make reasonable adjustments in his work demands to take account of 
religious observances, the regulation and Act do not really mean what 
they say. An employer, the Court concludes, need not grant even the most 
minor special privilege to religious observers to enable them to follow their 
faith. As a question of social policy, this result is deeply troubling, for a 
society that truly values religious pluralism cannot compel adherents of 
minority religions to make the cruel choice of surrendering their religion 
or their job. And as a matter of law today’s result is intolerable, for the 
Court adopts the very position that Congress expressly rejected in 1972, 
as if we were free to disregard congressional choices that a majority of this 
Court thinks unwise.”). 
83. See id. at 81 (majority opinion) (explaining that reasonable 
accommodations should not go so far as to deny an employer certain 
rights); see also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986) 
(“We find no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for 
requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable 
accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable 
accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation 
obligation.”). 
84. See infra note 148. 
85. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031–34 
(2015).  
86. Some legislation favoring religion or particular religions has been held to 
violate the Establishment Clause. Perhaps most on point is the Court’s 
decision in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), which 
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question87 may be of more than academic interest given developments 
that may portend a revision of Hardison.88 In the meantime, however, 
Hardison’s restrictive approach to religious accommodations continues 
 
struck down a Connecticut statute that prohibited employers from 
requiring an employee to work on his Sabbath. See id. at 710–11. That 
statute, however, was not limited to “reasonable” accommodations: it 
required accommodation by the employer regardless of the burden 
imposed. See id. at 709–10. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), 
the Court described the statute in Caldor as effectively having given “the 
force of law to an employee’s designation of his Sabbath day and required 
accommodation by the employer regardless of the burden that constituted 
for the employer or other employees.” Id. at 337 n.15. Amos held that 
Title VII’s exemption of certain religious employers from Title VII’s 
prohibition of discrimination on account of religion, even if not required 
by the Free Exercise Clause, did not violate the Establishment Clause. 
See id. at 334–35. 
 Some commentators have explained Hardison as an effort by the Court 
to avoid the issue it later faced in Caldor. See Pamela S. Karlan & George 
Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable 
Accommodation, 46 Duke L.J. 1, 6–7 (1996) (“Apparently to avoid 
constitutional questions under the Establishment Clause, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the duty of reasonable accommodation narrowly.”). But 
see Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the 
Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 Tex. L. 
Rev. 317, 402 n.373 (1997) (“[T]he Supreme Court in Hardison never 
offered the Establishment Clause as a rationale for its decision.”). Perhaps 
relevant to this debate is the fact that the Hardison dissenters went out 
of their way to explain how the canon of avoidance did not justify the 
majority’s decision. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 89–90 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court’s interpretation of the statute, by effectively 
nullifying it, has the singular advantage of making consideration of 
petitioners’ constitutional challenge unnecessary. The Court does not even 
rationalize its construction on this ground, however, nor could it, since 
‘resort to an alternative construction to avoid deciding a constitutional 
question is appropriate only when such a course is “fairly possible” or 
when the statute provides a “fair alternative” construction.’”) (quoting 
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378 n.11 (1977)). 
87. Constitutional limits on what accommodation duties the government 
might demand remain unclear; they may vary depending on the setting. 
The government itself seems relatively free to accommodate free of 
Establishment Clause concerns. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 329–30; Gonzales 
v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 
(2006) (upholding a preliminary injunction against the federal 
government’s enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act on religious-
freedom grounds when the sacramental use of hoasca was thereby 
burdened). In the context of private employers, however, Caldor is as close 
as the Court has come to deciding when a government-mandated 
accommodation is permitted. 
88. See supra note 12 for possible developments in this regard. 
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to govern Title VII cases.89 That means that many cases hold that a 
proposed accommodation is not required because it would pose an 
undue hardship for the employer.90 
 
89. See Laura E. Watson, Note, (Un)Reasonable Religious Accommodation: 
The Argument for an Essential Functions Provision Under Title VII, 90 
S. Cal. L. Rev. 47, 57–59 (2016).  
90. See, e.g., Yeager v. First Energy Generation Corp., 777 F.3d 362, 362–63 
(6th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (holding that an employer need not 
accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs by violating a federal 
statute); Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2013) 
(concluding that no accommodation—such as working from home or being 
assigned elsewhere—was required for a Sikh who was fired because she 
could not enter her IRS workplace as the length of her kirpan violated 
federal office security rules); EEOC v. GEO Grp., Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (holding that a prison need not accommodate female Muslim 
guards’ religious-based desire to wear khimars when the prison’s policy 
against headgear was justified by security concerns); Cloutier v. Costco 
Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that an employer 
was not required to accommodate plaintiff’s religious beliefs as a member 
of the Church of Body Modification by allowing her to wear her facial 
jewelry because doing so would be an undue hardship in terms of the 
employer’s public image, even though there were no complaints and other 
employees’ piercings went unnoticed); Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 
358 F.3d 599, 606–07 (9th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that it would be an undue 
hardship to either permit plaintiff to post anti-gay scriptural passages 
that demeaned co-workers or to exclude sexual orientation from the 
employer’s workplace diversity program).  
 Similarly, when employers offer some accommodation, courts have 
typically found them to be reasonable, thus pretermitting any exploration 
of whether another accommodation would be better suited to the 
employee’s requests. See, e.g., Telfair v. Fed. Express Corp., 567 F. App’x 
681 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that employer’s offer to transfer employees 
to lower-paid positions was a reasonable accommodation when reassigning 
them to a different shift would have required them to work on their 
Sabbath); Sánchez-Rodríguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673 F.3d 1, 
12–13 (1st Cir. 2012) (concluding that, taken together, the employer’s 
offer of a different position, allowing plaintiff to swap shifts, and refraining 
from disciplining him for absenteeism satisfied the employer’s statutory 
obligations).  
 Where an employee’s preferred accommodation collides with a collective 
bargaining agreement, courts typically find for the employer. See, e.g., 
Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 285 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that it was an undue hardship for trucking company to 
accommodate a Christian truck driver who refused to make overnight runs 
with female drivers because that accommodation would require the 
employer to violate a collective bargaining agreement under which drivers 
are dispatched in the order of seniority). Even where a collective 
bargaining agreement does not control, courts have been reluctant to 
require accommodations that burden co-workers. See, e.g., Bruff v. N. 
Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that it 
was an undue hardship to accommodate counselor’s religious beliefs by 
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Nevertheless, Title VII’s duty is not without teeth. A number of 
decisions have held in the employee’s favor, typically when relatively 
minor accommodations address the religious concern, such as perm–
itting shift swaps91 or short-term absences.92 This is particularly true 
when the proposed accommodation does not require any infringement 
on co-workers’ interests.93 
III. Title VII’s Prohibition of Retaliation 
As discussed above, § 704 of Title VII bars employer retaliation 
against an employee or applicant for both “opposing” unlawful employ–
ment practices and “participating” in proceedings under the statute.94 
The reach of this provision was at issue in EEOC v. North Memorial 
Health Care,95 in which the Eighth Circuit held that this language does 
 
assigning to other counselors her patients who wished help involving 
homosexual or extramarital relations). 
 Abercrombie’s effect on these decisions is another question. As we saw, 
that opinion stressed that Title VII demands more than “mere neutrality” 
with regard to religious practices and it used as an example an employer 
favoring a religious worker by exempting her from a neutral rule barring 
headwear. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; see also Abercrombie, 
135 S. Ct. at 2034. Abercrombie, however, did not address or even cite 
Hardison. 
91. Permitting voluntary shift swaps is often a reasonable accommodation. 
See Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d at 12–13 (1st Cir. 2012); Patterson v. 
Walgreen Co., 727 F. App’x 581 (11th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 18-349, Sept. 14, 2018. However, the extent to which such an offer 
actually accommodates the religious worker depends on the availability of 
volunteers and the employer’s response when a shift cannot be negotiated. 
See generally Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Accommodation in the Workplace: 
Why Federal Courts Fail to Provide Meaningful Protection of Religious 
Employees, 20 Tex. Rev. L. & Pols. 107 (2015). 
92. EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576–77, 1583 (7th Cir. 
1997) (holding that employer violated its accommodation duty by not 
rescheduling Jewish workers for Yom Kippur); see also Adeyeye v. 
Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 455–56 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(concluding that employer failed to show that allowing worker to take 
several weeks of unpaid leave would have caused it an undue hardship 
when there was high turnover of workers). 
93. See Kaminer, supra note 91, 141–43.  
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for any employer to discriminate against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made 
an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”). 
95. 908 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2018).  
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not categorically reach an applicant who is denied a job because she 
requested an accommodation for her religious observance.96 
The case began with an application for a hospital’s residency 
program by Emily Sure-Ondara, a Seventh Day Adventist.97 She 
received what the court described as a “conditional offer of employ–
ment”98 as a nurse, after which she first raised her “need [for] Friday 
nights off for Sabbath rest,” telling the hospital that “I don’t work 
Fridays.”99 After some back-and-forth between Sure-Ondara and the 
hospital, the hospital ultimately denied her accommodation request.100 
It insisted that work on alternate weekends was required by the 
governing collective bargaining agreement; Sure-Ondara responded that 
she needed the job and “would ‘make it work’ by finding a substitute 
for her Friday night shift or come in herself in an emergency or life-or-
death situation.”101 Ultimately, however, the hospital rescinded its job 
offer because it concluded that Sure-Ondara would not be able to swap 
shifts (Friday nights being unpopular) and “she would only show up for 
what she considered emergencies.”102 Although there was some 
unsuccessful effort by the hospital to find her another position, Sure-
Ondara filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which ultim–
ately brought suit on her behalf.103 
Although there was a plausible argument that North Memorial had 
violated § 703 by denying Sure-Ondara employment on the basis of her 
religion,104 the Commission sued only on the basis of § 704, claiming 
 
96. Id. at 1102.  
97. Id. at 1099.  
98. Id.  
99. Id. The court’s opinion seems to fault Sure-Ondara for not raising the 
issue earlier in the process. See id. (“Despite learning that a registered nurse 
working night shifts in the CACE Unit was required to work eight-hour 
shifts every other weekend—terms and conditions established by North 
Memorial’s collective bargaining agreement with the Minnesota Nurses 
Association—Sure-Ondara did not disclose that her religion would prevent 
her from working from sundown on Fridays to sundown on Saturdays.”). 
The relevance of that is not clear, and few attorneys would advise an 
applicant about either the need or wisdom of raising accommodation issues 
before the employer has made its initial hiring decision. 




104. The hospital ultimately rescinded its offer because of the applicant’s need 
for an accommodation, which fits squarely within the Abercrombie 
formulation. Id. at 1100–01. This case, however, deals with a situation 
not explicitly raised in Abercrombie: an employer who was not required 
to accommodate. Even granting this, the hospital’s action could be char–
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that the hospital engaged in unlawful retaliation.105 Because any adverse 
employment action against Sure-Ondara preceded her “participation” 
in a Title VII proceeding by virtue of filing a charge, only the 
“opposition” clause of the section was at issue, and the majority found 
that her request for an accommodation was not protected.106 In doing 
so, the court did not question that the nurse’s request for “a religious 
accommodation was based on a good faith, objectively reasonable belief 
that she was entitled to the requested accommodation.”107 Nevertheless, 
she did not “oppose” any unlawful practice, and her request was, 
therefore, not protected.108 
The majority recognized that the Supreme Court in Crawford v. 
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County 109 had held 
that the term oppose “carries its ordinary meaning,” and that any 
communication to the employer that conveys a belief that the employer 
has engaged in discrimination “virtually always constitutes opposition 
to the activity.”110 Crawford also held that merely answering questions 
in an internal investigation of sexual harassment could be opposition 
conduct.111 Thus, the Court interpreted oppose very broadly. Never–
theless, the North Memorial majority found that the EEOC claim 
foundered due to the fact that a request for accommodation does not 
necessarily oppose any discrimination: 
Sure-Ondara did not complain that North Memorial unlawfully 
refused to accommodate. She requested an accommodation, and 
 
acterized as discriminating against Sure-Ondara on the basis of her religion 
since, although she requested an accommodation, she also indicated that 
she would work without one, which seems to bring us back to 
Abercrombie. See id. at 1099–1100. Her charge had asserted such a 
violation, but why the EEOC did not pursue this claim in its suit on her 
behalf isn’t clear. See id. at 1100.  
105. The agency sought remedies for Sure-Ondara, “including injunctive relief 
and backpay, compensatory, and punitive damages,” id. at 1100, which 
raises its own questions. If Sure-Ondara was actually unwilling to perform 
the position’s duties without an accommodation that would be found 
unreasonable or an undue hardship, it is not clear why she should receive 
backpay, much less instatement (the default form of injunctive relief in 
Title VII cases). On the other hand, if she were willing to work even 
absent an accommodation, why did not the EEOC also file suit based on 
§ 703? 
106. See id. at 1101, 1103.  
107. Id. at 1103.  
108. Id. 
109. 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
110. Id. at 276.  
111. Id. at 273. 
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it is undisputed on this record that North Memorial’s non-
discriminatory practice was to consider such requests on a case-
by-case basis. After she made the request and no mutually 
acceptable accommodation was reached, Sure-Ondara’s Title VII 
remedy as an unsuccessful job applicant was a disparate treat–
ment claim under [§ 703-2(a)] for failure to reasonably accom–
modate.112  
The court concluded that, “[c]onsistent with the plain meaning of 
the word ‘oppose,’ the initial request for a religious accommodation 
simply does not ‘implicitly’ constitute opposition to the ultimate denial 
of the requested accommodation.”113 It also noted that, prior to 
Abercrombie, the EEOC had argued that Title VII created a cause of 
action for a failure to accommodate, a theory that the Supreme Court 
rejected in that case.114 Accordingly, the court reasoned that Aber–
crombie “precludes allowing the EEOC to repackage its rejected 
interpretation of unlawful discrimination under [§ 703] as an unlawful 
opposition-clause retaliation claim under [§ 704].”115 
The majority recognized that a request for accommodation under 
the ADA was protected activity under that statute, but it nevertheless 
distinguished that statutory setting in a somewhat confusing passage. 
It first noted that an ADA plaintiff must make a request for 
accommodation,116 but whether such a request is a precondition to a 
§ 703 suit under Title VII is an “open question after Abercrombie & 
Fitch.”117 Nevertheless, the court viewed Title VII’s “express reference 
to religious accommodation . . . as evidencing Congress’ intent to 
protect requests for religious accommodation. But the fact that such a 
request is ‘protected activity’ does not mean it is always ‘oppositional’ 
activity.”118 Apparently, sometimes it is and sometimes it isn’t. 
Trying to explain this distinction, the majority posited a hypo–
thetical employee who was fired for opposing a “foolish or ignorant” 
policy of not accommodating religious practices.119 Such a person would 
 
112. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1102. 
113. Id. 
114. Id.  
115. Id. 
116. See supra notes 94–108. 
117. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1103. Why the court thought that is not so 
clear since Elauf had not requested an accommodation and the Supreme 
Court found the employer to have violated the statute by not hiring her. 
See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031, 
2034 (2015). 
118. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1103. 
119. Id. 
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be protected. That would also be true, “if an employee or applicant in 
good faith requested a religious accommodation, and if the employer 
denied the accommodation on the ground that it was not in fact based 
on a religious practice and fired or refused to hire the employee or 
applicant because she made the request.”120 The court did not explain 
why it matters, given that the adverse action is the same (the applicant 
is not hired) whether the employer is retaliating because it does not 
believe that the request was based on religion as opposed to whether it 
believes the request cannot be reasonably accommodated without an 
undue hardship.121 
So far, whatever the merits of the majority’s opinion, it was 
defensible as a textualist application of § 704. In the last paragraph of 
the opinion, however, the court lost its way. The EEOC had accused 
the hospital of unlawful retaliation in rescinding its conditional offer of 
employment. The majority viewed this as “sophistry” since Sure-
Ondara “had the same right to religious accommodation as a job 
applicant under § 2000e(j) with or without a conditional job offer. 
Thus, rescinding that offer was not an adverse employment action.”122 
This is head-scratching since denying a job is the quintessential adverse 
employment action, and rescission of a job offer is the effective denial 
of a job. 
But the majority seemed to mean only that the denial, however 
adverse, was not actionable: it noted evidence adduced by North 
Memorial that it was “not feasible to hire an untrained Advanced 
Beginner into a team providing Hospice and Palliative Care to elderly 
patients if the applicant will not work the collectively bargained 
schedule.”123 Thus there could be no violation of § 703 because “[t]here 
is no duty to accommodate an applicant or employee by hiring or 
transferring her into a position when she is unwilling or unable to 
perform one of its essential job functions.”124 The point of the discussion 
seemed to be that Sure-Ondara had suffered no legal wrong since she 
wouldn’t have been hired in any event125: No harm, no foul. 
Circuit Judge Grasz dissented. In light of the “Supreme Court’s 
broad interpretation” of § 704 in Crawford and “the near-universal 
consensus of circuit courts of appeals interpreting almost identical 
 
120. Id. 
121. Id.  
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. The majority cited an ADA case, Faidley v. United Parcel Serv. of 
Am., Inc., 889 F.3d 933, 941 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc), for that 
unobjectionable proposition. 
125. See North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1103–04. The relationship between § 703 
and § 704 claims is revisited in Part IV infra. 
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statutory language” in the ADA,126 he would have found a request for 
accommodation to be protected “opposition.” He began by noting that 
the word oppose could have both narrow and broad meanings but that 
the Court in Crawford had opted for “an expansive view of the 
opposition clause, such that an individual does not need to directly or 
overtly communicate opposition to an unlawful employment practice—
conduct or communication that reveals opposition, even implicitly, is 
enough.”127 Key to the dissent were the following sentences: “Common 
sense dictates that requesting a religious accommodation in most 
circumstances communicates support for the grant of the request and 
opposition to its denial. In other words, the request itself conveys 
opposition to the employer’s failure to accommodate the applicant’s (or 
employee’s) religion.”128  
As for the ADA authority, the dissent noted that the Eighth Circuit 
(like almost all other circuits) had found requests for disability 
accommodations to be protected activity,129 and that “[u]nder general 
principles of statutory interpretation, statutes in pari materia are to be 
interpreted consistently and identical statutory language in related 
statutes is to be given the same meaning unless context dictates 
otherwise.”130 Further, Eighth Circuit authority had stated that 
“[r]etaliation claims under the ADA are analyzed identically to those 
brought under Title VII.”131 Although the dissent did not extensively 
discuss the ADA authority, it included a laundry list of ADA circuit-
court decisions that all relied on the portion of that statute with 
substantially identical language to Title VII rather than the ADA’s 
broader “interference” clause.132 
Having resolved the legal question in favor of protecting 
accommodation requests as “opposition,” the dissent had little difficulty 
finding that the EEOC’s claim should survive summary judgment.133 
 
126. Id. at 1104 (Grasz, J., dissenting). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 1105. Supplementing this argument was the policy concern against 
encouraging those requesting an accommodation to be more assertive in 
doing so. See id. (“Moreover, adopting too high a standard for opposition 
could have the unintended effect of forcing requesters to take a confront–
ational approach in order to be afforded Title VII’s protections against 
retaliation.”).  
129. Id. at 1104. 
130. Id. (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts 170–73, 252–55 (2012)). 
131. Id. (quoting Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir. 
1999)). 
132. See id. at 1105 & n.5. 
133. Id. at 1106–07.  
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The hospital’s withdrawal of its job offer was conceded to be materially 
adverse,134 and the hospital’s supposed nonretaliatory reason135 could 
not be credited on summary judgment. 
The dissent concluded by noting that it shared the majority’s 
“apparent concern that Title VII not be read so that meritless 
discrimination claims based on a failure to accommodate may simply 
be repackaged and resurrected as retaliation claims.”136 By “meritless,” 
the majority was apparently referring to claims where the law required 
no accommodation.137 In other words, the dissent recognized that a 
permissible failure to accommodate should not be converted into an 
actionable claim of retaliation but because of Title VII’s causation 
requirement, not its opposition requirement: 
In my view . . . it is the causation element that properly does the 
work of weeding out such claims, not the opposition requirement. 
Where an employer, after denying an accommodation request 
that it is not legally obligated to grant, refuses to hire an 
applicant because the applicant cannot or will not perform the 
job without accommodation, the employer can show the 
legitimacy of the action by evidence that the inability to perform 
the job was the cause of the employer’s adverse action, rather 
than retaliation for making the accommodation request.138  
Unlike merely repackaged claims, the claim before the court should 
survive “because there is evidence of retaliation, namely the evidence 
that Sure-Ondara told North Memorial she would work the job even 
without the accommodation and would show up for work if she could 
not find a replacement.”139 In this setting, the hospital’s withdrawal of 
 
134. Id. at 1106. Not every act of retaliation is proscribed by the statute; 
rather, the retaliatory action must be sufficiently “adverse” to be 
actionable, which means it must be serious enough to deter a reasonable 
employee from engaging in protected conduct. See Burlington N. & Santa 
Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (“[T]he employer’s actions must 
be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker 
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”).  
135. North Memorial claimed that it revoked the conditional job offer “because 
it was legitimately and sincerely concerned that, if hired, Sure-Ondara 
could not be counted on to work her designated shifts.” North Memorial, 
908 F.3d at 1106 (Grasz, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 1106–07.  
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 1107.  
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its job offer rendered it “reasonable for a fact-finder to infer that it did 
so because she had requested an accommodation.”140 
IV. Section 703 to the Rescue? 
Although the case generated an amicus brief on behalf of a number 
of organizations supporting religious liberty,141 the significance of North 
Memorial, even should the majority’s interpretation be generally 
adopted, is unclear. That is because § 703 might well provide sub–
stantial protection. If there is no corresponding § 703 claim, however, 
North Memorial would effectively immunize employers from liability 
should they retaliate against an employee or applicant for merely 
requesting a non-legally required accommodation, thus opening a 
gaping hole in the statute. To see this, imagine that the person seeking 
an accommodation is a present employee, and the employer fires him 
for making the request. Under the North Memorial majority’s analysis, 
the employer would be liable only if it were obligated to accommodate, 
and only under § 703.142 But the vulnerability to retaliation in this 
setting might discourage even requests that could be reasonably 
accommodated, thus undercutting a major thrust of the statute. The 
majority’s limited examples of extreme instances when a retaliation 
claim will nevertheless lie143 do little assuage that concern. 
But perhaps § 703 provides a solution essentially mooting the 
holding in North Memorial (which, recall, addressed only § 704). 
Certainly, even if requests for accommodation are not protected, an 
employee whose request should have been granted will have a claim 
 
140. Id. 
141. An amicus brief was filed on behalf of the General Conference of Seventh-
day Adventists, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, 
Mid-American Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, Christian 
Legal Society, Minnesota Catholic Conference, American Civil Liberties 
Union, American Jewish Community, and the ACLU of Minnesota. Amicus 
Brief of the Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists et al. at 17, North 
Memorial, 908 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2926). 
142. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1103. 
143. See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019 
Retaliation and Requesting Religious Accommodation 
408 
under § 703, which makes the absence of a § 704 claim irrelevant for 
such workers.144 This is the clear message of Abercrombie.145 
The obvious response is that, given the grudging scope of the Title 
VII accommodation duty, many, maybe most, requests can be legally 
rejected by employers. But does that mean there is no liability under 
§ 703 when an applicant who requests an accommodation is legally 
denied one? 
The answer is no. While an employer need not provide an 
accommodation that is an undue hardship, it cannot refuse to offer 
employment to an applicant who requests an accommodation. This is 
the purport of Abercrombie, but it also makes sense in terms of believer 
autonomy: the applicant should have a choice to accept the job without 
accommodation if she so chooses. Note that, under this analysis, North 
Memorial’s holding is largely irrelevant: while a request for 
accommodation may or may not be a violation of § 704, denial of a job 
to someone who requests an accommodation violates § 703 when that 
is the basis of the denial. To avoid a violation, the employer must offer 
the job sans accommodation (assuming it would otherwise have done 
so), leaving it to the applicant to decide whether to accept 
unaccommodated employment. 
This is certainly consistent with the language of Abercrombie, 
which declared that “[a]n employer may not make an applicant’s 
religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment 
decisions.”146 This passage is written broadly enough to embrace the 
situation where Elauf, the plaintiff in Abercrombie, could be legally 
denied her (supposed) accommodation request because it would be an 
undue hardship. And this reading does not leave the statute without 
meaning: Elauf might have chosen not to ask for an accommodation or 
might have chosen to work even if one were (legally) refused; 
Abercrombie & Fitch’s action preempted her choice. 
 
144. The amicus brief, however, pointed out that in the ADA context, the First 
and Third Circuits had noted the possibility of gaming the system: “if 
seeking an accommodation were not protected activity, an employer could 
temporarily grant an accommodation, then quickly fire the employee.” 
Amicus Brief, supra note 141, at 17 (citing Shellenberger v. Summit 
Bancorp, 318 F.3d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 2003); Soileau v. Guilford of Me., 
Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997)). There would, arguably, then be no 
discrimination claim for failure to accommodate and no retaliation claim. 
 The persuasiveness of this argument, however, is doubtful. In both the 
disability and the religion contexts, an employee’s discharge could easily 
be viewed as being related to her protected characteristic. Indeed, it fits 
perfectly into Abercrombie’s description of a § 703 claim arising when an 
employer acts because it must accommodate a religious practice. See 
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015). 
145. See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2031.  
146. Id. at 2033. 
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As for believer autonomy, Elauf was denied both the chance that 
the accommodation she (may have) sought would be required by Title 
VII and the option to work without being accommodated if granting it 
would have been an undue hardship. As for Sure-Ondara, the plaintiff 
in North Memorial, she was denied the job she apparently needed, and 
one which her religious convictions apparently permitted her to 
perform.147 
In response, it might be argued that the Abercrombie Court did not 
specifically address whether an employer would violate § 703 by 
refusing to hire someone when: (1) the applicant’s religion effectively 
disabled her from performing the job in question; and (2) the statute 
did not require the requested accommodation.148 And, at least where 
the applicant would not accept the position if she was not 
accommodated, the employer’s refusal to hire inflicts no tangible harm. 
That is true but it misses the point. First, it shifts the employment 
decision from the applicant to the employer, which is inconsistent with 
Abercrombie.149 Second, Title VII’s “motivating factor” liability also 
reaches situations where there is no but-for causation because the 
employer establishes that it would have reached the same decision in 
 
147. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
148. The majority’s failure to expressly deal with this possibility might be 
traced to an apparently innocuous footnote in the opinion: “For brevity’s 
sake, we will in the balance of this opinion usually omit reference to the 
§ 2000e(j) ‘undue hardship’ defense to the accommodation requirement, 
discussing the requirement as though it is absolute.” Abercrombie, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2032 n.1. 
149. See id. at 2032. 
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any event.150 That seems to capture precisely the situation above.151 In 
other words, the employer may be able to show that the religious 
observer would not have taken the job because she would have refused 
to perform it without the accommodation, thus establishing the same 
result in any event. But the employer would nevertheless have violated 
§ 703’s motivating-factor test by withholding an offer because of the 
applicant’s religion. 
The oddity in this analysis is that it seems to provide meaningful 
protection only for those who request an accommodation that they do 
not “need,” in the sense that they are willing to work even if the 
accommodation is denied. Some might even argue that this scenario 
casts doubt on the applicant’s sincerity in requesting the 
accommodation to begin with.152 
That would be a mistake. Requesting an accommodation that is 
not absolutely necessary, in the sense that the applicant’s beliefs do not 
prevent her from taking the job if not accommodated, is apparently not 
 
150. Section 703(m), added by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, provides: 
[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 
 Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 107(a), § 703(m), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(m) (2012)). Although liability attaches 
when a motivating factor operates, Congress simultaneously amended the 
statute to provide a limited affirmative defense: should defendant carry a 
burden of persuasion that it would have reached the same decision even 
had the illicit “motivating factor” not been present, the plaintiff’s remedies 
are severely restricted. Id. sec. 107(b)(3), § 706(g)(2)(B), 105 Stat. 1071, 
1075–76 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012)). 
See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Making Too Much of Too Little?: Why 
“Motivating Factor” Liability Did Not Revolutionize Title VII, 62 Ariz. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: 
Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 911, 
932–38 (2005) (analyzing the evolution of employment discrimination law 
and mixed-motives cases). 
151. If the employer legally denies the accommodation but continues to offer 
the job to the applicant, there will be no violation of the statute: the loss 
of employment is the result of the applicant’s choice, not the employer’s 
violation of any legal duty. 
152. See, e.g., Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 14, 
United States v. Ozaukee County, No. 2:18-cv-00343, 2018 WL 6304888 
(E.D. Wis. June 11, 2018) (arguing that “[t]he fact that [Plaintiff] chose 
her job over her beliefs by acceding to” behavior that arguably did not 
conform with her religion after being denied an accommodation “supports 
a finding of insincerity”), dismissed, No. 2:18-cv-00343, 2019 WL 2291514 
(E.D. Wis. May 3, 2019). 
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an unusual situation.153 Arguably, that was the case in North Memorial: 
Sure-Ondara indicated she was willing to work despite the absence of 
an accommodation. It is true that at least some courts have suggested 
that the duty of accommodation reaches only practices that are 
religiously required.154 That intuition may stem from the fact that the 
accommodation duty is sometimes framed in terms of relieving believers 
from having to choose between their jobs and their creeds, casting as 
disingenuous those requesting an accommodation if they are willing to 
work without it. 
But the statute does not say that a religious practice or    
observance must be “compelled” to be accommodated.155 In fact,         
the notion of “required” religious observances reflects a very cramped 
view of   religion since many  religions are less  commandment-oriented  
than  the  Judeo-Christian tradition.156  Other courts have rejected any 
  
 
153. See cases cited infra note 157. 
154. See Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he 
issue here is whether there exists a genuine dispute of material fact 
whether Davis sincerely felt that she was religiously compelled to attend 
and participate in a special service at church . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
Some cases speak in terms of “required” or “compelled” religious practices 
but focus on whether the practices are “religious” to begin with. See 
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 451 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(reasoning that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find 
that his attendance at burial rites for his father was religious in nature 
rather than only “a filial duty that Title VII does not recognize or 
protect”). 
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (defining religion as including “all aspects 
of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,” and not just aspects 
that are compelled).  
156. See, e.g., The Seven Principles, Unitarian Universalist Ass’n, 
https://www.uua.org/beliefs/what-we-believe/principles [https://perma.cc/ 
 N7M4-K86Q] (last visited Sept. 28, 2019) (setting out the principles of 
Unitarian Universalist congregations as a “guide” rather than “dogma or 
doctrine”). 
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requirement that the observance or practice be required or central,157 
and that seems more consistent with the general reluctance of secular 
courts to decide questions of religious doctrine.158 Further support for 
rejecting such a view comes from the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, both 
of which protect religious practices and beliefs, regardless of whether 
they are compelled.159 Generally speaking, “religious liberty” can 
 
157. E.g., Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438–39 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(allowing a claim for failure to accommodate an employee’s attendance at 
his wife’s conversion ceremony and further noting that a court should not 
inquire whether a particular practice is mandated or prohibited by a 
religion because that would involve deciding religious questions); Redmond v. 
GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 900–01 (7th Cir. 1978) (attendance at a Bible 
study class is protected because all “aspects of religious observance and 
practice” are protected (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012))); Cooper v. 
Gen. Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that, barring 
an undue hardship to the employer, “[i]f the employee’s conduct is 
religiously motivated, his employer must tolerate it”); Reyes v. N.Y. State 
Office of Children & Family Servs., No. 00 Civ. 7693(SHS), 2003 WL 
21709407, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003) (“Title VII protects more than 
the observance of Sabbath or practices specifically mandated by an 
employee’s religion.”). 
158. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1872) (declining to resolve 
a property dispute between competing church factions); Kedroff v. Saint 
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 
116 (1952) (declaring that churches should be free from state interference 
in deciding “matters of church government as well as those of faith and 
doctrine”). 
159. “The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, whether or 
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012). This definition, found in the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), was adopted by reference 
for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) when RLUIPA was 
passed. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 7(a)(3), 114 stat. 803, 806; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-
2(4) (2012). The original text of RFRA merely defined the “exercise of 
religion” as “the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the 
Constitution.” Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-141, § 5(4), 107 stat. 1488, 1489; see also Douglas Laycock, RFRA, 
Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 145, 151 (1995) (“Congress 
rejected the view that only religious compulsion is protected. In committee 
hearings, lobbyists offered amendments to change to a compulsion 
standard, but those amendments went nowhere.”). 
 Of course, one could argue that RLUIPA’s language reflects a perceived 
need to expand prior protections rather than confirming what earlier 
statutes may have meant. Nevertheless, the Court has often stressed the 
inappropriateness of the judiciary assessing religious claims beyond testing 
the sincerity of such views. E.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. 
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“[C]ourts must not presume to 
determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility 
of a religious claim.”); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) 
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certainly reach religious practices that do not rise to the level of 
religious mandates.160 
In short, an applicant or employee can ask for an accommodation 
while not “needing” it to remain employed, and such a request does not 
necessarily raise questions about her sincerity.161 In North Memorial 
itself, Sure-Ondara’s beliefs were apparently more nuanced than they 
at first appeared. According to an amicus brief submitted in part on 
behalf of Seventh-day Adventist governing bodies, rest on the Sabbath 
“is near the center of what it means to be a Seventh-day Adventist.”162 
However, the religion also highly values “the relief of human suffering 
and care for the sick . . . values that go back to the ministry of Jesus 
Christ.”163 As a result, “Adventist hospitals and healthcare workers 
balance this biblical good of healing with Sabbath observance by not 
 
(“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular 
beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ 
interpretations of those creeds.”). See generally Derek L. Gaubatz, 
RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of 
RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 501, 522–
29 (2005) (arguing that requiring religious activity be compelled is 
contrary to clear Supreme Court precedent but noting a number of lower-
court cases that imposed such a requirement under RFRA (as originally 
enacted)). Accordingly, the provisions of RFRA and RLUIPA to this 
effect are best viewed as declarative of a constitutional requirement rather 
than a mere statutory command. 
160. Admittedly, such a view expands the universe of potential 
accommodations and therefore poses more of a burden on employers, even 
under the current grudging approach to what is required. 
161. While there can be no inquiry into the rationality of a particular belief, a 
court can determine whether the asserted belief is sincerely held. See, e.g., 
EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y 
Alcantarillados de P.R., 279 F.3d 49, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2002) (reversing 
summary judgment for the EEOC where the sincerity of a claimed 
Seventh-day Adventist was challenged by evidence of his conduct contrary 
to the tenets of his professed religious belief). Nevertheless, there are very 
few cases successfully challenging an employee’s sincerity. See Tagore v. 
United States, 735 F.3d 324, 325–26, 328 (5th Cir. 2013) (reversing 
summary judgment and holding that, despite arguments that a slightly 
shorter blade length would satisfy plaintiff’s religion, there was a genuine 
issue of material fact on the sincerity of Tagore’s practice of wearing a 
kirpan with a three-inch blade). See generally Nathan S. Chapman, 
Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 1185 (2017) 
(explaining the sincerity requirement in the law of religious 
accommodations and arguing for its continued viability). But see Cameron 
& Hutchinson, supra note 69, at 498–99 (arguing that inquiry into 
sincerity is impermissible). 
162. Amicus Brief, supra note 141, at 27. 
163. Id. at 28. 
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doing unnecessary work that day.”164 That meant that Sure-Ondara’s 
request for an accommodation was not inconsistent with her later 
willingness to work on Fridays if such work proved necessary. Such a 
principle seems applicable to a wide range of accommodation requests 
from adherents to any number of religions. 
This interpretation of Title VII largely moots the holding in North 
Memorial, but it raises two questions. The first is the possible chilling 
effect on believers of a rule under which requests for accommodation 
are not protected from employer retaliation. The countervailing 
textualist positions are well set out in both the majority and the 
dissent,165 but the Supreme Court has not always been as relentlessly 
textualist as it has sometimes been recently. For example, while § 704 
does not by its terms apply to former employees, the Court has held 
retaliation against them to be impermissible.166 More generally, the 
Court has held that retaliation for opposing discrimination falls within 
the prohibition of discrimination itself under several statutes even 
without specific language to that effect.167 In short, it would not be 
unprecedented to find requests for accommodation protected under the 
statute even if they do not fit neatly into a court’s interpretation of 
opposition. The North Memorial dissent’s reading is at most a short 
step away from textualism, and certainly within the outer bounds 
Crawford’s broad reading of opposition.168 
The second question this interpretation of Title VII raises is how 
§ 703 would apply in a case such as Sure-Ondara’s or in other situations 
 
164. Id. at 29. 
165. EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1101 & n.2 (8th Cir. 
2018) (textualist argument for the majority); id. at 1104 (Grasz, J., 
dissenting) (textualist argument for the dissent). 
166. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997). 
167. E.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446, 452–53 (2008) 
(noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits not only racial discrimination but 
also retaliation against those who oppose such discrimination); Gómez-
Pérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008) (prohibiting retaliation against 
federal employees asserting ADEA rights under the ADEA’s federal-
employee provisions, which explicitly reach only age discrimination); 
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U.S. 167, 173, 179 (2005) 
(prohibiting retaliation against those asserting Title IX rights under Title 
IX’s bar on sex discrimination); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 
U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (holding that retaliation against those asserting 42 
U.S.C. § 1982 rights against race discrimination is prohibited by that 
provision). But see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 
356–57 (2013) (concluding that Title VII’s retaliation provision requires a 
higher standard of causation than the Title’s status protections given 
differences in statutory language). 
168. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 
276–78 (2009). 
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where a request for an accommodation raises doubts in the employer’s 
mind about the employee’s willingness to perform if the accommodation 
is not forthcoming. Recall that Sure-Ondara said that, absent shift 
swaps, she would work in “an emergency or [a] life-or-death 
situation.”169 That, quite naturally, gave rise to concerns by the hospital 
as to whether she would make her own determinations about what 
counted as a sufficient reason to work. Even the dissent seemed to think 
that North Memorial should be exonerated if the jury credited its claim 
that it revoked the conditional job offer “because it was legitimately 
and sincerely concerned that, if hired, Sure-Ondara could not be 
counted on to work her designated shifts.”170 
But, of course, such doubts could arise only from Sure-Ondara’s 
original request for an accommodation and what the hospital viewed as 
insufficient assurances that she would work even if denied it. 
Unfortunately, there does not seem to have been much development of 
this between the employer and the applicant, but it would seem that, 
given Abercrombie, the hospital would be required to accept sufficiently 
concrete assurances by an applicant that she would perform the duties 
of the position.171 While the hospital could discharge an employee for 
not working when required, it cannot assume that an employee’s 
religious practices and beliefs will preclude her from working those 
shifts.172 This is where the ADA’s interactive process requirement would 
prove helpful. Whether Sure-Ondara’s statements were sufficiently 
concrete seems to be a question of fact.173 
 
169. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1100. 
170. Id. at 1106–07 (Grasz, J., dissenting). 
171. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 
(2015) (explaining that an employer violates Title VII when acting on an 
“unsubstantiated suspicion” that accommodation would be needed). See 
also North Memorial, 908 F.3d 1098, 1106–07 (8th Cir. 2018) (Grasz, J., 
dissenting) (“Where an employer [denies] an accommodation request that 
it is not legally obligated to grant, . . . the employer can show the 
legitimacy of the action by evidence that the inability to perform the job 
was the cause of the employer’s [decision], rather than retaliation for 
making the accommodation request.”). 
172. See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033 (2015) (“If the applicant actually 
requires an accommodation . . . and the employer’s desire to avoid the 
prospective accommodation is a motivating factor in his decision, the 
employer violates Title VII.”).  
173. See North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1106 (Grasz, J., dissenting) (explaining 
that Sure-Ondara repeatedly assured North Memorial that “she would 
take the job even without the accommodation and would ‘make it work,’” 
which should create a question of fact). The structure of the litigation 
could be debated. While the plaintiff almost certainly has the burden of 
showing that the employer fired or refused to hire a worker because it 
believed she would not work without the requested accommodation which 
was legally denied, at that point the employer should be required to show 
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Conclusion 
It is a troubling notion that requests for a religious accommodation 
are unprotected under Title VII unless the requested accommodation is 
mandated under the law—a possible reading of Abercrombie through 
the North Memorial lens. If generally accepted, it would chill religious 
employees from requesting any accommodation, especially since 
Hardison’s narrow view of an employer’s accommodation duty means 
that employers are often not legally required to grant the request. 
Fortunately, the North Memorial opinion did not address the question 
of whether denying a job to someone whose accommodation request was 
legitimately turned down may violate § 703’s prohibition of status 
discrimination, even if it does not violate Title VII’s prohibition of 
retaliation under § 704. Nevertheless, the North Memorial result is 
problematic on its own terms since it reflects an overly literal reading 
of the statute, one that is contrary to several Supreme Court opinions. 
Further, as the North Memorial dissent suggests, a request for an 
accommodation may easily be interpreted as opposing an employer’s 




that it had reasonable grounds for belief that the employee would not 
work in that setting. Proof that the position was offered to an applicant 
or that an employee refused to perform would suffice but sufficiently 
concrete statements by the employee would also suffice. An interactive 
process clarifying the employee’s plans would be helpful. What would not 
be permissible is the assumption that the plaintiff would not work if not 
accommodated merely because she requested an accommodation. 
